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Abstract
This paper develops a theory of focusing and framing in an intertemporal context
with risky choices. We provide a selection criterion between existing theories of fo-
cusing by allowing a decision maker to choose her frame such that her attention is
either drawn to salient events associated with an option or to the expected utilities an
option yields in different time periods. Our key assumption is that a decision maker
can choose her frame in a self-serving manner. We predict that the selected frame
induces overoptimistic actions in the sense that subjects underrate downside risk but
overrate upside risk and accordingly reveal overoptimistic choices. Hence, our theory
can explain phenomena such as excessive harmful consumption (smoking, unhealthy
diet) and risky investments (entrepreneurship, lotteries, gambling) in one coherent
framework. Notably, overoptimistic actions are not universal, but have plausible lim-
its. We characterize under which situations overoptimistic actions are most likely to
occur and under which circumstances choices should be rational or even pessimistic.
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1 Introduction
Attentional focusing affects choices in many contexts. According to Kahneman (2011, p.
324), “our mind has a useful capability to focus on whatever is odd, different or unusual.”
Recently, this mechanism has been formally modeled, thereby explaining a broad vari-
ety of choice puzzles described in the empirical and experimental behavioral economics
literature. At its core, attentional focusing assumes that aspects of an alternative which
are especially salient are overweighted, whereas less prominent, but possibly important
aspects are underweighted. This distortion gives rise to an alternative’s focus-weighted util-
ity, and decision makers select among the alternatives to maximize their focus-weighted
utility rather than their actual net present value.
Attentional focusing has been investigated in two seminal contributions by Kőszegi
and Szeidl (2013, henceforth: KS) and Bordalo et al. (2012, henceforth: BGS).1 Either of
these models introduces a specific approach toward the framing of decision situations
and proposes a frame in which decision makers evaluate the available options.2 Each
frame induces distortions of attention and therefore biased decisions if decision makers
focus on features that are rendered especially salient in the respective frame. The main
difference between the two approaches lies in whether attributes decision makers may
focus on are defined on a state basis in a time period (BGS) or on the expected utility
of an option in a time period (KS). Then, according to each of the frames, attention is
guided toward those attributes in which the range of choice is broader, that is, in which
the available options differ a great deal. Those attributes which gather much attention are
overweighted insofar as the decision weights on these attributes are enhanced while less
salient attributes are rather neglected. But theway the attributes are specified is crucial for
the models’ implications so that predictions of the two approaches may be very different.
The aim of the present paper is to bring together these two approaches. Note that we do
not provide a novel frame, but instead propose a selection criterion between these two
existing frames.
To do so we present a theory of intertemporal decision making in a risky environment
1In both approaches attention is stimulus-driven, that is, automatically directed toward certain out-
standing choice features. A different class of models assumes that attention is goal-directed, that is, a
scarce resource which is allocated to attributes ex ante, either in an efficient way or guided through pri-
ors (Schwartzstein, 2014; Gabaix, 2014; Woodford, 2012). Lieder et al. (2016) have linked these two strands of
research by providing a microfoundation of salience. Accordingly, an over-representation of extreme events
in decision making as suggested by KS and BGS may simply reflect the rational use of limited cognitive re-
sources. An approach to limited attention that is very different to these approaches is undertaken byMasatli-
oglu et al. (2012) who assume that an agent chooses the optimal option from her consideration set, which does
not include all alternatives due to attention limitations. They analyze underwhich conditions choices provide
information on whether an option was included in the consideration set or not.
2Notably, framing in general captures two different notions: the way alternatives are presented and ar-
ranged (visual frame), and the way in which the alternatives are mentally represented by the decision maker
(mental frame). The models we bring together belong to the second category, providing approaches how a de-
cision maker can frame outcomes. Recent studies by Leland and Schneider (2016) and Dertwinkel-Kalt and
Köster (2015) have explained how the visual frame may impact on the mental frame. They obtain variants
of the approach by BGS that account, for instance, for puzzles of choice under risk that mainly occur under
specific visual representations of a decision situation (such as violations of first-order stochastic dominance).
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that encompasses both previous approaches. We incorporate the core assumption that a
decision maker adopts the frame that yields a higher focus-weighted utility, that is, for
a given decision situation the decision maker can decide in which frame information is
perceived.3 Such a self-serving interpretation of information is consistentwith psycholog-
ical insights (e.g., Falk and Zimmermann, 2016; Dawson et al., 2002; Balcetis andDunning,
2006). Therefore, in our model, a decision maker is hypothesized to choose both (1) an
alternative, and (2) the frame in which she evaluates the respective alternative in order
to maximize her focus-weighted utility. Our equilibrium notion requires the consistent
choice of alternative and frame.
We derive our main results by comparing behavior in two different classes of deci-
sion situations. In one class people trade immediate benefits against future downside
risks, and in the second class they trade immediate costs against future upside risks. This
classification comprises many relevant decision situations. Among others, the first class
contains decisions of harmful consumption: an unhealthy eating habit may provide im-
mediate pleasure, but may also cause future costs in the sense that it may trigger diabetes
or increases the risk of heart attacks. The second class typically contains investment de-
cisions such as the decision of whether or not to start an own business. Becoming an
entrepreneur involves an immediate investment and the chances of rewards in the future.
As the key result, our model yields predictions concerning overoptimistic actionswhile
neither BGS nor KS can, taken by itself, explain overoptimistic actions in situations with
future downside risk andwith future upside risk in one coherent framework. Each of these
two models accounts for such overoptimistic behavior only in one class of situations, but
predicts the opposite in the other one. That is, in their models, some actions could be
regarded as overoptimistic and some as overly pessimistic. The notion of overoptimism
only enters through our selection criterion. We can rationalize overoptimistic behavior
in the sense that decision makers underrate downside risks but overrate upside risks.
Consider the first scenario as an example of harmful consumption: Harmful consump-
tion like smoking gives an immediate pleasure, but may cause serious diseases like lung
cancer which may be realized in any future period with a small probability. An indi-
vidual framing the decision in terms of events as suggested by Bordalo et al. (2012) over-
rates the incidence of getting lung cancer due to its severe negative outcome and there-
fore abstains from smoking. As this adverse outcome is unlikely, however, the expected
smoking-induced harm in each future period in time is rather small compared to the large
immediate pleasure derived from smoking. Thus, an individual frames the decision via
expected utilities in time periods as suggested by KS, thereby underrating the importance
of the dispersed future risks and overrating the immediate benefits of smoking. As a con-
sequence, she opts for the latter frame and smokes, even if it might be rational to abstain.
The same individual’s attitude toward risk is fundamentally different in a decision
situation with future upside risk. Suppose the agent decides whether to launch a new
3This assumption stands in contrast to alternative approaches (e.g., Piccione and Spiegler, 2012) that treat
the framing of options as a choice variable for the firm offering the alternatives.
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business. For this, an initial investment is required and future rewards are highly un-
certain. Entrepreneurship offers the chance of a very high income, but, on average, it is
not profitable (Hamilton, 2000). Expected payoffs in each period may be rather small, but
since the entrepreneurship offers the chance of a high reward, this is especially salient.
Thus, the agent decides in favor of the representation via events and thereby overrates
her winning chances. This can explain excessive entrepreneurship. Taken together, our
model can explain overoptimistic actions in situations with future downside risk andwith
future upside risk in one unified framework—which existing contributions cannot.
In addition, we obtain more general insights into a decision maker’s frame and con-
sumption choices. The more asymmetric an investment option is (that is, an option which
yields large potential payoffs in exchange for immediate costs), the more likely the deci-
sion maker is to adopt the frame proposed by BGS and to overrate potential future re-
wards. The more asymmetric a consumption option is (that is, an option which yields an
immediate benefit in exchange for potential large future costs) themore likely the decision
maker is to evaluate the respective option in the frame proposed by KS.
It is important to notice that ourmodel does not predict such overoptimism per se, but
has plausible limitations. For example, a risk-averse agent will always prefer safe options
(ensuring safe and positive outcomes in all time periods) over symmetricmean preserving
spreads. Hence, our model does not contradict risk-averse or match risk-seeking behavior
in general.
We proceed by presenting our model in Section 2 and deriving our main results on
overoptimistic actions in Section 3. In Section 4, we relate our findings to the asymmetry
of choice options and derive the limits of overoptimism in our framework. In Section 5
we discuss the related literature. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Two Types of Focusing
This section presents a theory of intertemporal decision making in a risky environment in
which the decision maker chooses—beside a neutral frame—between one of two frames
as proposed by KS and BGS. Thus, we do not provide a new frame in which the deci-
sion maker evaluates her choices, but rather a unified framework that encompasses both
approaches and a criterion that selects between the two frames.
2.1 The Model
We consider choices by a decision maker in a period 0 from a choice set C. Each of the
options yields (risky) outcomes in each of the following T periods. The decision maker
evaluates the options according to a frame which may yield a valuation that differs from
the net present value.
More specifically, the decision problem consists of the following elements:
(1) a choice set C := {ci|1 ≤ i ≤ I} with I choice options ci = (ciτ)τ∈T , where 1 ≤ i ≤ I , and
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(2) a time horizon T ,
(3) probability spaces (Sτ ,Fτ , pτ ) for all periods τ ∈ T ,
(4) a set of frames X .
For 0 < T ∈ N, define the time-horizon T := {0, 1, . . . , T} as the set of periods under
consideration. In each time period τ there is a set of states of the world Sτ . For each
τ ∈ T and some I ∈ N there is a real-valued random variable ciτ with finite support
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ I . Denote Sτ the sample space (also called the state space or the set of
(personal) events in period τ ) which is generated by the random variables {ciτ |1 ≤ i ≤ I}
and denote Fτ the corresponding canonical σ-algebra.4,5 We consider a probability space
(Sτ ,Fτ , pτ ) for some probability measure pτ , which assigns each state of the world s ∈ Sτ
its objective probability pτ,s := pτ (s), such that
∑
s∈Sτ pτ,s = 1 holds. Each state s ∈ Sτ
can be written as a vector which assigns each alternative ci ∈ C an outcome ciτ,s := ciτ (s),
that is, s = (ciτ,s)ci∈C . We refer to ciτ,s as the consumption level which choice ci provides in
period τ and state s.6
A decision maker knows the probability distributions pτ and has to choose in period
0 one option from the choice set C before uncertainty is resolved and states for all periods
are realized.7
A consumption level ciτ,s provides a utility to the decision maker, which is given by
an instantaneous consumption utility function u : R → R which is constant over time and
strictly monotonically increasing. We set u(0) = 0. We assume that the decision maker
discounts utilities at period τ via a discounting function δ(τ). For instance, in the case of
exponential discounting (Samuelson, 1937), δ(τ) = δτ holds. In line with KS, we impose
additive separability between utilities in time periods throughout the paper.
Finally, a decision situation is always represented in some frame x ∈ X , where X de-
notes the set of available frames. A frame (or, synonymously, focus type) denotes a decision
maker’s mental representation of a decision situation. In the following, we will—beside
a neutral frame where evaluations match expected utility—analyze two specific frames
proposed in the behavioral literature, which direct the decision maker’s attention toward
different aspects of the available choice options.
4In many applications, the state space is defined over all periods 0, 1, . . . , T . Here, we define a separate
state space for each point in time to keep the model tractable. Our assumption of separate state spaces for
each point in time fits our assumption that decision makers consider outcomes at points in time separately.
5In line with the literature (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2012) we assume that the state space is exogenous and
well-defined by the available choice options such that each state can be identified with a feasible payoff-
combination of the available options.
6The random variable ciτ could represent a risky asset or lottery, or an immaterial consequence such as a
health impact. If an agent, for instance, decides to smoke a cigarette in period t, her respective option ci may
involve the negative health impact ciτ for τ > 0. Thus, by consuming a cigarette at t, she has to decide for the
entire bundle ci which also comprises future negative health impacts ciτ for τ > 0.
7For our model, it is irrelevant whether the states are realized simultaneously or sequentially as the only
decision is made ex ante, before any uncertainty is resolved.
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Neutral frame (N): Net present value. A decision maker opting for a neutral frame (without
attention distortions) evaluates an option ci = (ci0, . . . , ciT ) ∈ C based on its net present value,
that is,
U(ci|N) := U(ci) =
T∑
τ=0
δ(τ)E(u(ciτ )). (N)
with
E(u(ciτ )) =
∑
s∈Sτ
pτ,su(c
i
τ,s).
However, a decision maker may not necessarily evaluate options according to net
present value, but may rather evaluate the options unconsciously according to attention-
biased frames. As each frame induces the decision maker to focus on certain aspects, we
call the distorted utilities that we define in the following approaches focus-weighted utili-
ties. In our theory, as is detailed below, we endogenize a decision maker’s representation
of a choice problem by assuming that she can choose her frame. To proceed, we first need
the notion of a focusing function.
Definition 1 A focusing function is a continuous function g : R≥0 → R>0.
In the two approacheswhichwepresent in the following, the focusing function assigns
each state (time period) aweight, the so-called focus weight, which is a function of the range
of attainable utilities in the specific state (time period). Range refers to the difference
between the maximally and the minimally achievable utilities in the respective state (time
period). The larger the focus weight on a state (point in time), the more salient is the state
(point in time). We adopt the assumption by KS, according to which the focusing function
is strictly monotonically increasing, that is, a decision maker puts a higher focus weight
on a state (time period) the larger the range of attainable utilities in this state (period).8
Assumption 1 The focusing function g is strictly monotonically increasing.
In the following we present two different frames according to which decision situations
can be evaluated. While, in principle, one can think of many different frames, here we
focus on two frames proposed in the recent literature (BGS, KS).
Frame (E) according to KS: Focus on expected utilities in time periods. Frame (E) guides
the decision maker’s attention toward different periods in time, so that she attaches focus weight
gτ := g
(
max
ci∈C
δ(τ)E(u(ciτ ))− min
ci∈C
δ(τ)E(u(ciτ ))
)
(E1)
8The assumption of a strictlymonotonically increasing focusing function is also shared by the continuous
approach presented in the appendix of Bordalo et al. (2016) and discussed in more detail in Dertwinkel-Kalt
and Köster (2017a).
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on the expected utility she derives from option ci in period τ . Define the normalization factor
gE :=
1
T + 1
T∑
τ=0
gτ .
The focus-weighted utility of a decision maker who frames a decision situation via expected out-
comes in time periods is then defined as
U(ci|E) :=
T∑
τ=0
δ(τ)
gτ
gE
E(u(ciτ )). (E)
=
T∑
τ=0
δ(τ)
gτ
gE
∑
s∈Sτ
pτ,su(c
i
τ,s)
This implies that with a focus on time periods, the focus weight depends, as in KS, on the
(discounted) range of utilities a decision maker may receive in a given period. Formally,
the argument of the focusing function g equals the range of attainable expected utilities
possible to be received by a decision maker in a certain time period. Since g is strictly in-
creasing, time periods with a larger range of possible expected utilities among the options
receive more weight in the decision process than periods where the options under con-
sideration deliver more balanced expected utilities. All focus weights are divided by their
average. This allows for comparability with the focus-weighted utilities derived from the
following, alternative approach.9
Frame (S) according to BGS: Focus on states. Frame (S) induces the decision maker to focus
on salient states, so that she misinterprets the probability with which a state s occurs according to
a focus weight assigned by some given focusing function g. Her subjective probability that state s
occurs in period τ equals
p˜τ,s :=
gτ,s
gτ,S
pτ,s,
where the focus weight gτ,s is defined as
gτ,s := g
(
max
ci∈C
δ(τ)u(ciτ,s)− min
ci∈C
δ(τ)u(ciτ,s)
)
(S1)
and the normalization factor
gτ,S :=
∑
s∈Sτ
pτ,sgτ,s
9This normalization has been chosen as it is analogous to the one chosen in the following approach, which
is also shared by Bordalo et al. (2012). It ensures that in a choice set consisting of non-risky constant income
streams (which give the same certain payoff in every period) any option’s focus-weighted utility in any of
the frames matches its net-present value. Intuitively, if the outcomes of an option are safe and identical in
all periods, focusing on expected utilities at points in time or focusing on risky states should not affect the
option’s evaluation.
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ensures that
∑
s∈Sτ p˜τ,s = 1.
10 Denote c˜iτ as the random variable which realizes ciτ,s with proba-
bility p˜s. Accordingly, the focus-weighted utility is defined as
U(ci|S) := U(c˜i) =
T∑
τ=0
δ(τ)E(u(c˜iτ )) (S)
=
T∑
τ=0
δ(τ)
∑
s∈Sτ
gτ,s
gτ,S
pτ,s u(c
i
τ,s).
In contrast to frame (E), this frame guides the decision maker’s focus toward states, such
that the focus weights gτ,s are defined on the set of states. Weights are not attached to the
expected utility of an option in a given period, but rather to states swithin a given period
that are more salient by offering a larger range of utilities across the different options. As-
sumption 1 then implies that a state receives relatively more weight in the decision process
if the range of possible utilities across the options differs more.
This frame implies that, as in Bordalo et al. (2012), a state swhere the options’ payoffs
are very different receives a relatively large weight in the decision process, that is, the
subjective probability p˜τ,s exceeds the objective one. That is, stateswith a possibly extreme
outcome (yielding either an extremely positive or an extremely negative utility) receive
a relatively large weight in the decision process, even if the expected utilities across the
options do not differ much at that period in time and if the probability of the extreme
event is rather small. In contrast, states inwhich all options’ payoffs are relatively balanced
receive less focus weight.
2.2 Solution Concept
We ask which decision situations are evaluated in which frame. Therefore, we apply the
following equilibrium concept.
Definition 2 For ci ∈ C and x ∈ X we denote (ci, x) a self-serving equilibrium (SSE) if
U(ci|x) ≥ U(cj |y)
for all cj ∈ C and all y ∈ X .
A self-serving equilibrium is defined as the optimal combination of a consumption
choice and a frame. Thus, the decisionmaker optimizes over both the consumption choice
and the frame. This implies, in particular, that in a self-serving equilibrium consumption
choice and frame choice are consistent: given the frame choice, the decision maker has
no incentive to switch her consumption choice, and given her consumption choice, the
decision maker has no incentive to switch her frame. Note that the timing of choices does
not have an effect on the equilibrium: the equilibrium outcome is independent of whether
10Note that this normalization is equivalent to Bordalo et al. (2012). According to this normalization, low
probability states are relatively more distorted than high probability states.
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the frame is selected prior to the choice option or vice versa. It should also be noted that
frame choice may happen subconsciously. We do not think that subjects willingly and
consciously think of options in away that is too rosy. Instead, subconscious processesmay
drive an interpretation of the options at hand that stresses upsides or blurs downsides.11
In our subsequent analysiswe investigate underwhich circumstances a decisionmaker
behaves in an overoptimisticmanner. We say that a decisionmaker behaves overoptimistic
if the following definition is met:
Definition 3 A SSE (ci, x) is overoptimistic if the following two conditions hold:
(i) U(ci|x) > U(ci) and
(ii) there is another option cj 6= ci with U(cj) > U(ci).
Our definition of overoptimism requires two conditions to be met. First, the decision
maker believes to receive a higher utility than she actually does. Second, there is at least
one other option that would yield a higher net present value than the chosen action. If
all self-serving equilibria are overoptimistic we also say that the agent engages in overop-
timistic actions.
2.3 Discussion of the Psychological Foundations
Here, we discuss the two main psychological assumptions underlying our model, atten-
tion to salient features and self-servingness in choosing a frame and directing attention.
Further constituents of our model are discussed in the original papers by KS and BGS.
Salience. People’ s attention is often drawn towardmore vivid attributes, which receive
a disproportionate weight in the decision process when comparing different options (Tay-
lor and Thompson, 1982). A well-known example comes from Schkade and Kahnemann
(1998) who argue that when comparing the quality of life in California and the Midwest,
a decision maker attaches a disproportionate weight to climate and weather conditions
compared to other attributes where the regions are more similar.
Which features of a given decision situation attract the decision maker’s attention de-
pends on the representation of the decision problem. In decision situations under uncer-
tainty, a frame may either direct attention toward salient states associated with an option
(for instance, the large gains of winning the jackpot of a lottery) or toward the expected
outcome an option yields at a certain point in time (for instance, a lottery’s expected pay-
off). While other frames guiding the decision maker’s attention toward different aspects
could exist, we restrict our paper to these frames as these have an intuitive appeal and
can explain important choice patterns (BGS, KS) that have been empirically (Hastings and
11Note that the equilibrium notion is similar to Bracha and Brown (2012) where risk perception is affected
by a decision maker’s emotional process. In their equilibrium notion, action and risk perception are chosen
in a consistent manner.
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Shapiro, 2013) and experimentally (Dertwinkel-Kalt et al., 2016, 2017; Frydman and Mor-
mann, 2016) supported.
Variants of the focusing and salience models proposed by KS and BGS can account
for a wide range of decision anomalies. Bordalo et al. (2013b) explain puzzles of con-
sumer choice such as decoy and compromise effect via salience. Leland and Schneider
(2016, 2017) have proposed an axiomatized version of the salience model that explains
hyperbolic discounting and present-biased behavior. Also, choice puzzles thatmostmod-
els cannot account for can be reconciled with the salience model. Leland and Schneider
(2016) andDertwinkel-Kalt andKöster (2015) show that violations of first-order stochastic
dominance may result from a specific interplay of economic and visual salience. Salience
has been also successfully applied to different economic field such as political economy
(Nunnari and Zápal, 2017), law and economics (Bordalo et al., 2015), business economics
(Dertwinkel-Kalt and Köster, 2017b) and industrial organization (Bordalo et al., 2016; Her-
weg et al., 2017).
Self-servingness. Self-serving judgments or self-serving assessments of information rep-
resent a robust psychologicalmechanism that can be observed inmany circumstances. For
example, people’s judgment of what is fair is influenced by self-interest (Messick and Sen-
tis, 1979), but also objective information is assessed in self-servingmanners (Dawson et al.,
2002; Balcetis and Dunning, 2006). Whereas according to BGS and KS attention is fully
shaped by the environment, Falk and Zimmermann (2016) find in an experimental study
that this is not entirely true, concluding that “subjects can actively manage attention in a
self-serving way.”
In our model, self-servingness is reflected by positing that a decision maker’s assess-
ment of risky situations is influenced by her choice of a frame in order to maximize her
focus-weighted utility. As will be seen later, the assumption that the frame is chosen is the
key assumption of our model, and helps us to explain why decision makers may assess
risk quite differently when faced with large upside or downside risks.
Importantly, while information processing appears to be self-serving, the resulting
choices can be self-deceiving or self-destructive in the long run: overweighting favor-
able and underweighting undesired features can induce choices with severely bad conse-
quences in the long run. Therefore, choices which we call self-servingmay be self-serving
only in the short run while being harmful in the long run.
3 Overoptimistic Actions
Each intertemporal decision trades relative benefits in some time periods for relative costs
in other time periods. We distinguish between two major, opposing classes of decision
situations: people may either trade immediate benefits for future costs or immediate costs for
future expected rewards.
Any kind of harmful consumption typically belongs to the first class: people smoke,
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drink alcohol or engage in unhealthy eating habits. In other words, people take risks and
potential future costs in terms of bad health to enjoy immediate pleasure. By smoking
now, people have a higher risk of getting respiratory diseases or lung cancer. By drinking
too much alcohol, people risk getting liver diseases and hepatic cancer, and an unhealthy
diet may trigger the development of diabetes. According to our model, this is driven
by overoptimism: people adopt frame (E) as proposed by KS which blurs the options’
downsides. Below we argue that, according to our model, in those situations decision
makers choose frame (E) and thereby direct their attention to the expected utilities in
different periods associated with an option. Consequently, they somewhat ignore the
downsides as these are blurred over time: the enjoyable immediate effect yields a large
positive utility, while the adverse components of the choice are, in each future period,
small in terms of expected utilities. As a result, focusing on relatively large expected
utilities in different time periods overrates the upsides, but underweights the downsides
from present consumption.
Investment decisions belong to the second class: people incur immediate costs to gain
benefits in the future. A prime example is entrepreneurship where a decision maker in-
vests in a new business, and the chances of success are highly uncertain. Existing research
suggests that people are too optimistic when becoming an entrepreneur (Camerer and Lo-
vallo, 1999; Koellinger et al., 2007). Failure rates are high and, on average, it is not profitable
to become an entrepreneur (Hamilton, 2000;Moskovitz andVissing-Jorgensen, 2002). Our
model can explain this overoptimistic, probably excessive, entrepreneurial activity. When
deciding to invest, people choose frame (S), as proposed by BGS, and direct their atten-
tion on the chance of becoming "the next google" while neglecting that on average it is far
more likely that the new business will result in failure.
A similar example is the phenomenon that somany people engage in games of chance,
which often have a significant negative expected return. In Germany alone, 25.5 million
people participated in gambling in 2011, while 11.6 million took part in the weekly Satur-
day lotto. Especially lotto subscriptions are widespread, according to which agents make
a certain payment in order to participate in each weekly lotto over a longer period. How-
ever, only 48% of the stakes are on average returned to the gamblers (Beckert and Lutter,
2007). Our model yields an intuitive reason for engaging in unprofitable gambling: peo-
ple choose to focus on the winning states (by adopting frame (S)) and therefore overrate
their chances of winning.
Specification. In the following, we consider binary decisions as such a simplified setup
suffices to generate our model’s main insights.12 We also abstract from any time discount-
ing and set δ(τ) = 1, but our results are fully transferable to setups in which future (per-
12We are mainly interested in analyzing whether people engage in a certain behavior, and not to which
degree they engage in such actions. Hence, we consider a setup with a binary decision. Moreover, arbitrary
consideration sets yield vast state spaces and, therefore, cannot be analyzed in general.
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ceived) utilities are discounted (for a discussion of the role of discounting see Section 6).13
We consider the choice between a risky option cu and a safe option cc (which we inter-
pret as abstaining from the risky option) in a period t. The safe option realizes a payoff ccτ at
each point in time τ . We set the payoff of the safe option to ccτ = 0 for all τ . The uncertain
option cu involves for each period a random variable cuτ that either gives outcome cuτ,1 or
cuτ,2. Therefore, Sτ consists of two states, indexed by 1 and 2, for all τ > 0.
3.1 Harmful Consumption (or Future Downside Risk)
We start with a situation where a decision maker trades off immediate (safe) benefits
against future downside risks. These situations can be represented by choices from a
choice set C = {cc, cu}, where cc represents the safe option of abstaining from harmful
consumption, while cu is the potentially harmful activity that imposes a risk upon the
decision maker.
We model the risky option of harmful consumption as follows. Let F := u(cu0) > 0
denote the immediate safe net present value of the risky option to be obtained in period
0. Since immediate gratification is assumed to come at the cost of future risk, cuτ for τ > 0
may yield two different outcomes. Therefore, for all periods τ > 0wedistinguish between
two states. Either, the risky option yields the same outcome as the safe option (s1), or it
yields an adverse outcome (s2) such that −L := u(cuτ,2) < 0. For instance, in the smoking
example, state 1 represents the outcome that the smoker is not diagnosedwith lung cancer,
and state 2 represents the outcome where she is. We assume that the probability space
is identical over all τ > 0.14 Let p := pτ,2 denote the probability of state 2 at each τ > 0.
We denote the expected utility that comes with the initial choice of the harmful product
in each future period τ > 0 by f := −E(u(cuτ )). We consider L > F > f . That is, we
consider situations where the utility loss (−L) in the downside state is relatively large but
occurs with a relatively small probability.
We now analyze the choices made by a decision maker whose attention is drawn on
states (S) or on expected utilities (E). Note that the assessment of the safe option is inde-
pendent of the chosen frame since U(cc) = U(cc|S) = U(cc|E) = 0.
To start with, suppose that the decision maker evaluates the risky option according
to frame (S). We first note that the downside risk of the risky option is the more salient
state, and hence, gτ,2 = g(L) > gτ,1 = g(0). This implies that the decision maker tends to
13In that case, however, without knowledge of the exact shape of the focusing function, our formulas
would be cluttered as the focusing function would have to be evaluated at many points.
14Then, it is implied that cuτ for τ ∈ T are independently and identically distributed (iid) which is a strong
assumption that might be too strict in many applications. While independence of {cuτ |τ ∈ T } is a formal
component of our model, we relax this assumption in Appendix A and show that our main results also carry
over to correlated random variables. For instance, in the smoking example, a more plausible assumption
would be that if the decision maker gets lung cancer in some period t, then this negative health impact is also
present in all periods τ > 0.
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overweight the downside risk compared to a rational decision maker. That is:
U(cu|S) = F − T
(
Lp
g(L)
pg(L) + (1− p)g(0)
)
< F − TLp = U(cu).
Due to the higher focusweight on the downside the decisionmaker attaches less focus-
weighted utility than a rational decision maker to the risky option. In other words, focus-
weighted utility falls short of consumption utility, and an agent of focus type (S) is less
likely to take the risk than a rational agent.
Next, consider the case where the decision maker evaluates the options in frame (E).
In that case, the decision maker evaluates the options according to the expected utility
provided in each period. The focus-weighted utility experienced by the decision maker
with frame (E) is given by
U(cu|E) = T + 1
g(F ) + Tg(f)
(g(F )F − Tg(f)f) . (1)
With F > f it follows that g(F ) > g(f), and an agent puts more weight on the
concentrated upside of the risky option (the immediate benefit in period 0) than on the
dispersed downsides.15 Since the agent puts too much weight on the immediate gratifi-
cation compared to the downside, the focus-weighted utility exceeds net present value,
U(cu|E) > U(cu). Therefore, a decision maker tends more toward the risky option.
Indeed, with focus (E) an agent chooses the risky option as long asU(cu|E) > 0, which
holds if and only if
g(F )
g(f)
>
Tf
F
. (HC)
If the focusing function is sufficiently steep, that is, the fraction g(F )/g(f) is suffi-
ciently large, then the agent will choose cu over cc. However, the risky option represents
the suboptimal choice, U(cu) < U(cc), as long as the dispersed risks outweigh the im-
mediate benefits, F < Tf . Thus, if the focusing effect is strong enough, an agent will be
overoptimistic concerning her consumption decision’s future costs.
Since U(cu|E) > U(cu) > U(cu|S), the focus-weighted utility is higher when the deci-
sion maker is of focus type (E). By focusing on the case where a rational decision maker
would not choose the risky option (i.e., F < Tf ), we summarize our preceding discussion:
Proposition 1 Suppose L > F > f and F < Tf . If and only if Condition (HC) holds, the
unique SSE, (cu, E), is overoptimistic.
The proposition provides conditions as towhen andwhy a decisionmakermay decide
to engage in risky options with large downside risks, even when it is not rational to do so.
By choosing to focus on aggregate outcomes at each point in time, she avoids explicitly
15If f > F , then both types of local thinking predict an overweighting of the downsides, such that in
equilibrium the individual will never engage in harmful consumption.
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thinking of the downside state of the risky option. Therefore, the overoptimistic decision
maker is less concerned regarding the potential downsides than is rational and is more
likely to choose the risky option.16
Furthermore, if there is an ex ante positive risk that the adverse outcome is realized
in each period τ > 0 (independent from the decision maker’s consumption decision),
our qualitative predictions are not affected. Then, three states are feasible, in which con-
sumption and no consumption yield both utility 0 (state 1), both utility −L (state 2), or
exclusively consumption induces the adverse outcome, while no consumption does not
(state 3). Here, frame (S) renders state 3 salient, while frame (E) allows the decisionmaker
to focus on the immediate benefit derived from smoking. Therefore, a sufficiently strong
focusing bias induces the decisionmaker to behave optimistically, to choose frame (E) and
underrate consumption risks.
We can shed more light on the intuition behind Proposition 1 by comparing options
that yield identical net present value, but differ in how the costs are distributed over pe-
riods:
Prediction 1 Consider two options cu1 and cu2 which yield identical net present value U(cu1) =
U(cu2) and the same benefit F > 0 in period zero. Furthermore, suppose that the costs associated
with cu2 are spread over a larger number of periods, T ′ > T . That is, cu1 yields outcome −L with
probability p in all T periods, while cu2 yields outcomes −Lτ with probabilities pτ in all periods
1 ≤ τ ≤ T ′. Suppose pτLτ < f := pL for all τ and L > F > f . Then, if a decision maker
chooses cu1 from {cu1 , cc}, she chooses also cu2 from {cu2 , cc}.
The intuition behind this finding is the following. As a decision maker choosing the
risky option evaluates it in frame (E), she chooses the risky option all the more if the
negative consequences are spread over more periods, and this holds independent of the
distribution of the negative consequences. This is because costs attract less attention if
they are dispersed over more periods. This finding contrasts with Prediction 2 in the next
section, where the risky option will be evaluated in frame (S).
3.2 Taking Bets (or Future Upside Risk)
Now consider the opposite case where the risky option includes a (non-stochastic) imme-
diate investment cost and the returns are random and dispersed over all future periods.
As before, we set the utility from the safe option (i.e., not becoming an entrepreneur)
to ccτ = 0 for all τ . The risky option (becoming an entrepreneur) involves an investment
−H := u(cu0) in period 0, and gives rise to a future stochastic payoff. The state space is
assumed to be constant across periods in time and to comprise exactly two states. We
16A series of recent studies supports our prediction of overoptimistic smokers according to which smok-
ers underestimate the own risks associated with smoking (Weinstein et al., 2004; Windschitl, 2002; Williams
and Clarke, 1997; Slovic, 1998; Waltenbaugh and Zagummy, 2004; Costa-Font and Rovira, 2005; Masiero et al.,
2015). Interestingly and in line with our predictions, these studies do not find that smokers necessarily un-
derstimate the other smokers’ risks of smoking, that is, rosy beliefs are only in place if the ownwelfare might
be affected.
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define state 1 as the loss state, in which the lottery pays 0 (the new business is a failure
and the initial investment is lost), and we define state 2 to be the winning state (becoming
the next google) yielding utility G with probability q. The expected utility from the risky
option in future period τ is then h := E(u(cuτ )) for all τ > 0.17 We consider G > H > h
such that the upside of the risky option,G, is very prominent, but occurs with a relatively
small probability.
In principle, our arguments from above are turned upside down if we consider future
upside risks instead of a future downside risk. Suppose the decision maker uses frame
(E). Since g(h) < g(H), this implies that the one-time investment cost is givenmoreweight
relative to the expected future benefits. In a situation where it is rational not to invest in
the risky option (i.e., H > Th) this also implies that U(cu|E) < U(cc|E) = 0 holds.
Now suppose that the decision maker’s attention is drawn toward potential states of
the lottery so that the decisionmaker uses frame (S). In this case, the winning state, which
yields G, is particularly salient. Due to g(G) > g(0), the decision maker has a large focus
weight on the upside of the investment lottery. As the lottery’s upside is given more
weight by the biased decisionmaker than by a rational decisionmaker, the focus-weighted
utility derived from frame (S) exceeds the net present value. In fact, with a focus on salient
states, a decision maker would choose the risky option over the safe option if and only if
U(cu|S) > U(cc|S) = 0, which holds if and only if
−H + TG · qg(G)
qg(G) + (1− q)g(0) > 0, (2)
or, equivalently,
g(G)
g(0)
>
H(1− q)
q (TG−H) . (TB)
If the focusing bias is strong enough, that is, the fraction g(G)/g(0) is large enough,
then an agent of focus type (S) will choose to invest even if its expected payoff is negative,
that is, H > Th, and a rational decision maker would behave risk-averse by picking the
safe option.
SinceU(cu|S) > U(cu) > U(cu|E), in the case of future upside risk, the decisionmaker
will choose frame (S) and thereby obtains a higher focus-weighted utility. However, by
doing so, she decides to ignore expected outcomes and to focus on beneficial states. There-
fore, agents may invest excessively in a new business and are overoptimistic about the
likelihood of success.
Proposition 2 Suppose G > H > h and H > Th. If and only if Condition (TB) holds, the
unique SSE, (cu, S), is overoptimistic.
Wepoint out that Proposition 2 holds for small, but not too small values of thewinning
17Note that this implies that the size of the winning state, measured by G, does not change over time.
Whereas this is a restricting assumption in order to simplify the state space, our analysis also holds with
respect to different-sized gains. However, more assumptions about the shape of the focusing function would
then have to be made.
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probability q. For small values of q it is indeed optimal not to invest in the risky option.
However, q must not be too small so that the decision maker with focus (S) still finds it
worthwhile to invest and Condition (TB) holds.18
As in the previous subsection, we can also analyze the decision maker’s behavior by
comparing options that yield the same net present value, butwhere the benefits are larger,
but less likely:
Prediction 2 Consider two options cu1 and cu2 which yield identical net present value U(cu1) =
U(cu2) and the the same utility−H < 0 in period zero. Option cu1 yields utilityG with probability
q in periods 1, . . . , T , and cu2 yields utility Gτ ≥ G with probability qτ ≤ q in periods 1, . . . , T ′.
Then, if a decision maker chooses cu1 from {cu1 , cc}, she chooses also cu2 from {cu2 , cc}.
This finding follows the intuition in Bordalo et al. (2012) and their Proposition 1 where
a small probability’s upward distortion is the larger the smaller the probability and the
larger the corresponding outcome is. Accordingly, keeping the net present value constant,
an option becomes more attractive if it gives the prospect of less likely, but larger gains.
Note that we did not have to specify whether T ′ is larger than T or not.
3.3 Attention and Overoptimistic Actions.
Our previous results are summarized in the following corollary. As our core predictions
are overoptimistic actions, we subsequently discuss the psychological phenomenon of
overoptimism.
Corollary 1 Fix L > F > f and G > H > h as well as p, q > 0. Assume that H > Th and
F < Tf hold and that conditions (HC) and (TB) hold. Then, an agent engages in overoptimistic
actions in each situation and underrates adverse risks, but overrates favorable risks.
According to our model, people reveal overoptimistic actions. If focusing effects are
sufficiently strong, then a decision maker in our model tends to ignore downside risks
and engages in risky behavior which a rational agent would abstain from. The very same
agent, however, also overrates upside risks and therefore bears unreasonable, immediate
investment costs which are unlikely to pay off. The first kind of behavior is explained
by KS and the second kind of behavior by BGS. Overoptimistic actions result from our
selection criterion between these two frames.
Our results coincide with the robust finding in psychology that people are overly or
unrealistically optimistic. For example, empirical studies show that people often tend to
be too optimistic about their future prospects, overrate possible positive events and under-
rate potential negative events (e.g., Weinstein, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988; Weinstein,
18Entrepreneurial overoptimism is widespread (Cooper et al., 1988). It has also been shown to be signif-
icant in closely related situations of economic interest, such as market entry (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) or
investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).
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1989).19 In particular, entrepreneurs are oftenmuch too optimistic regarding their chances
of making a success of their enterprise (Koellinger et al., 2007). Our model produces such
overoptimistic behavior.
Note that while all of our separate results directly follow either from BGS or from KS,
neither of these decision models can jointly explain overoptimistic actions in situations
with future downside risk and with future upside risk. Thus, the novelty in our study
does not lie in proposing a newway of framing as such, but it provides a selection criterion
between these two frames that have been proposed in the literature. In Bordalo et al. (2012)
a decisionmaker overvalues states where the options differ more. Therefore, in situations
with large upside risk thismodel predicts that peoplewould excessively decide in favor of
the risky option. This coincides with our prediction. However, with large downside risk,
Bordalo et al. (2012) predict people to overate the salient downside so that these would be
less likely to engage in the risky option. This contrasts with our predictions.
The focusing model by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) produces the opposite predictions
to Bordalo et al. (2012). With a focus on expected utilities in different time periods, their
main result is a bias toward concentration. This implies that in situations where an agent
trades off an immediate benefit against a future downside, concentrated benefits would
be overweighted and actions would be more likely to be overoptimistic. In contrast, in
the investment situation, the decisionmaker would overestimate the one-time investment
costs and therefore be less likely to choose the risky action.
We can transfer our insights from this section to other domains beside intertemporal
decisions. Our results in the subsection harmful consumption imply that people take too
many risks in several dimensions in order to enjoy a certain large benefit in one dimen-
sion, whereas the subsection taking bets reveals that people may sacrifice too much in one
dimension to achieve unlikely high benefits in another dimension of their choice.
To sum up, our model shows how self-serving interpretations of decision situations
can counteract pure attention effects and can therefore be seen as a selection criterion
between Bordalo et al. (2012) and Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). In particular, wewould argue
that both theories can only partially explain observed behavior, but our unified approach
with a self-serving focus can explain overoptimistic behavior with both future upside and
downside risks in one framework.20
4 Overoptimism and its Limitations
This section discusses two issues. First, we generalize the intuitions behind the overopti-
mism result of the preceding section. Second, we also discuss situations where our model
19Psychologists have shown overoptimism to be present in a wide variety of contexts. For an overview
see, for instance, Shepperd et al. (2013). More generally, people tend to be more overoptimistic if events are
perceived as infrequent such as being involved in a car accident (Harris et al., 2008).
20Parts of our findings can be also explained by hyperbolic discounting as analyzed in O’Donoghue and
Rabin (1999). Crucially, however, our findings do not rely on a particular discounting function: instead, our
attention mechanism can even reverse the prediction of present bias, that is, the model can predict future-
biased choices if a large reward can be obtained in a later period.
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does not predict an overoptimistic assessment of a choice situation.
4.1 Overoptimism and Asymmetry of Options
This subsection provides more intuition on our mechanism of endogenous framing by
studying the effects of the asymmetry of options on the focus-weighted utility derived
from the options. We will show that more asymmetric upside risks make it more likely
that frame (S) is adopted while more asymmetric downside risks make it more likely that
frame (E) is selected.
Suppose that a decision maker can choose between a risky option cu and a safe option
cc yielding a utility of zero in every period τ ∈ T . Assume that for periods τ ∈ T1, where
T1 ⊆ T , the risky option yields a utility gain Gτ with probability pτ and a loss of −Lτ
with probability 1− pτ such that pτGτ − (1− pτ )Lτ = zτ ∈ R. If option cu is evaluated in
frame x ∈ {S,E}, we denote the sum of its focus-weighted utilities over all periods T \T1
as cux ∈ R.
Note that the evaluation of the safe option is independent of the frame and, hence,
U(cc|S) = U(cc|E) = U(cc) = 0. Given frame (S), cu yields the focus-weighted utility
U(cu|S) = cuS +
∑
τ∈T1
pτg(Gτ )Gτ − (1− pτ )g(Lτ )Lτ
pτg(Gτ ) + (1− pτ )g(Lτ ) . (3)
In the following we consider two such risky options (denoted A1 and A2) which are
defined as follows. First, they are identical with respect to all periods τ ∈ T \T1. Second,
in all periods τ ∈ T1 both options represent upside risks, that is, G1τ , G2τ > Lτ where Giτ
denotes the gain optionAi provides in period τ . Third, we say that upside riskA2 is (weakly)
more asymmetric than A1 if G2τ ≥ G1τ in all τ ∈ T1.
Analogously, let A′1 and A′2 be two options which differ only with respect to periods
τ ∈ T1. In these periods, both options represent downside risks, that is, L1τ , L2τ > Gτ where
Liτ denotes the loss optionA′i provides in period τ . Furthermore, we say that downside risk
A′2 is (weakly) more asymmetric than A′1 if L2τ ≥ L1τ in all τ ∈ T1. The following Proposition
(proven in the Appendix) evaluates the effect of more asymmetric payoff distributions on
the frame choice if a risky option is compared to the safe option cc.
Proposition 3 (Bias toward Asymmetry for up- and downside risks)
i) Let A1 and A2 be two risky options, where upside risk A2 is more asymmetric than A1. If
(A1, S) is a SSE in {A1, cc} then (A2, S) is a SSE in {A2, cc}.
ii) Let A′1 and A′2 be two risky options, where downside risk A′2 is more asymmetric than A′1.
If (A′1, E) is a SSE in {A′1, cc} then (A′2, E) is a SSE in {A′2, cc}.
Proposition 3 shows thatmore asymmetric outcomedistributions havedifferent effects
on the frame choice depending on whether the skew is in the gain or the loss domain.
18
Part i) shows that a more asymmetric upside risk makes it more likely that a decision
maker adopts frame (S). More specifically, if the option A1 is evaluated in frame (S) and
chosen in equilibrium from {A1, cc}, also the more asymmetric upside risk A2 is chosen
from {A2, cc} in a SSE. This is due to the fact that the more asymmetric an upside risk is,
the more favorable it will appear to be if evaluated through frame (S). Put differently, the
utility derived from evaluating an upside risk in frame (S) is the higher the more asym-
metric the risk is as we show in the proof of the Proposition 3. In contrast, evaluations
in frames (E) and (N) are not affected by the asymmetry of the options. Thereby, part i)
relates to skewness preferences (e.g., Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Ebert andWiesen, 2011)
whereby a decision maker prefers upside risks the more positively skewed (or, in our ter-
minology, the more asymmetric) they are. The model by BGS accounts for skewness pref-
erences (see Bordalo et al., 2013a; Dertwinkel-Kalt andKöster, 2017a); likewise, it gives rise
to part i) of Proposition 3. Furthermore, part i) extends Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013)’s bias
toward concentration to the domain of decision making under risk. A bias toward concen-
tration means that a low-probability, large outcome is preferred over a smaller outcome
with a higher probability. Correspondingly, part i) and its proof yield that a decision
maker gets a higher utility fromA2 (as its gain is larger, though less likely than that ofA1)
if frame (S) is adopted.
Conversely, by part ii), the more asymmetric a downside risk is, the more likely it is
to be evaluated in frame (E). If there is a SSE (A′1, E) in {A′1, cc}, also the more negatively
skewed option A′2 is a SSE in {A′2, cc}. Note that this does not imply that a subject is
more likely to choose a risky option yielding a loss the more negatively skewed it is. It
rather implies that the more asymmetric a downside option is, the less likely a decision
maker is to evaluate the option via frame (S) and the more likely she is to adopt frame
(E) which blurrs unfavorable consequences. Thereby, part ii) closely relates to the aver-
sion toward negatively skewed options that the model by BGS predicts (see Bordalo et al.,
2013a; Dertwinkel-Kalt and Köster, 2017a).
Altogether, Proposition 3 implies a bias toward asymmetry. Loosely speaking, the more
asymmetric outcome distributions are the more likely it is that in a self-serving equilib-
riumadecisionmaker adopts a framewhich is different from the neutral one and themore
likely it is that a decision maker engages in overoptimistic actions. Whether the bias goes
in the direction of overemphasizing potential gains (adopting frame (S)) or blurring negative
consequences (adopting frame (E)) depends on the direction of the asymmetry. Thereby,
Proposition 3 generalizes our results from Section 3.
4.2 Limitations of Overoptimism
While people behave overoptimistically and therefore risk-seeking inmany situations, op-
timistic behavior is not universal in our model. In the following, we discuss situations
where our model predicts that a decision maker does not make overoptimistic choices.
This analysis yields important differences between our model and models of overopti-
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mism such as Mayraz (2011) as those cannot account for the limitations of overoptimism
we delineate here (see also Section 5).
We discuss the choice between a safe option cc and a risky option cu which represents
a mean preserving symmetric spread of the safe option. Suppose that the two options yield
the same payoffs in all but one period. In that specific period the safe option offers a
safe payoff whereas the risky option offers a gamble with a 50% chance of exceeding the
payoff of the safe option and a 50% chance of falling short by the same amount. Formally,
let cuτ = ccτ ′ for all τ, τ ′ ∈ T \{τ¯}. At τ = τ¯ , option cu pays ccτ¯ − α or ccτ¯ + α for some α > 0,
each with a 50% probability. As cu represents a mean preserving symmetric spread of cc,
both options yield the same expected payoffs. We will show that in this class of decision
situations ourmodel’s predictions entirelymatch the predictionsmade by expected utility
theory.
We impose the following assumptions on the agent’s utility function. As before, an
outcome of zero yields zero utility, andwe assume that the utility is strictlymonotonically
increasing in the outcome. Second, we distinguish whether the agent has a linear utility
function and is therefore risk-neutral, or whether her utility function is concave (convex)
such that she is risk-averse (risk-seeking).
Expected utility theory. Expected utility theory predicts that the risk-neutral agent is in-
different between the two options, whereas a risk-averse (risk-seeking) agent is predicted
to strictly prefer the safe (risky) option.
As we will show in the following, the choices our model predicts are independent of
the focus type, and decisions are in line with expected utility maximization. Therefore,
as revealed in the present analysis, overoptimism in our model has plausible limitations.
Note that in order to compare utilities derived from the alternatives, we can restrict our
analysis to the options’ payoffs at the specific point in time τ¯ since they yield equal payoffs
at all other points in time.
Frame (S). First, we assume that the decision maker uses representation (S). Given that
the agent has a linear utility function, the focusweights on both feasible states are identical
and equal g(u(ccτ¯ )−u(ccτ¯ −α)) = g(u(ccτ¯ +α)−u(ccτ¯ )). Consequently, both options’ focus-
weighted utilities match the net present value and the agent is indifferent between both
alternatives, that is, U(cc) = U(cc|S) = U(cu|S).
Under risk-aversion, the focus weight on cu’s relative downside is particularly large,
g(u(ccτ¯ )−u(ccτ¯−α)) > g(u(ccτ¯ +α)−u(ccτ¯ )), so that U(cu|S) < U(cc|S). This is reversed un-
der risk-seekingness: the focus weight on the relative upside becomes particularly large,
such that U(cu|S) > U(cc|S). Therefore, given a focus on states, the safe option is pre-
ferred by the risk-averse agent, while the risk-seeking agent prefers the risky option. These
predictions exactly meet expected utility maximization. Note that the agent, however,
overestimates in each case the difference in utility between the two available options. If
the risky option yields the higher focus-weighted utility, then its relative upside is over-
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valued, whereas if the safe option is preferred, then the risky option’s relative downside
is overvalued.
Frame (E). Second, we analyze utilities if the agent incorporates frame (E). With a linear
utility function both alternatives yield the same expected utilities at all points in time.
Therefore, the agent is indifferent between both options.
Under risk-aversion, the safe option cc gives a higher expected utility at τ¯ . Provided
T > 0, both options’ focus weights are larger at τ¯ than at all other points, so that the safe
option is preferred while the difference in utility between the two options is overrated.
The reverse holds if the agent is risk-seeking where the risky option is preferred and the
difference in utility between the two options is overrated as U(cu|E)−U(cc|E) > U(cu)−
U(cc). Therefore, our model predicts maximization of expected utilities if options are
evaluated in frame (E).
Proposition 4 Suppose a decision maker chooses between a safe option cc and a riskier alternative
cu, which is a two-outcome, mean preserving symmetric spread of the safe option in one period.
Then, our model makes the following predictions.
(i) A risk-neutral decision maker is indifferent between both options, that is,
maxx∈{S,E}{U(cc), U(cc|x)} = maxx∈{S,E}{U(cu), U(cu|x)} holds.
(ii) A risk-averse decision maker strictly prefers the safe option over the risky alternative, that is,
maxx∈{S,E}{U(cc), U(cc|x)} > maxx∈{S,E}{U(cu), U(cu|x)}.
(iii) A risk-seeking decision maker strictly prefers the risky option over the safe option, that is,
maxx∈{S,E}{U(cc), U(cc|x)} < maxx∈{S,E}{U(cu), U(cu|x)}.
The preceding proposition shows that for mean-preserving symmetric spreads, the pre-
dictions of our model are fully in line with the predictions by rational choice for various
typical curvatures of the utility function.
Remark. Note that the preceding analysis carries over to slightly more general cases.
First, it holds true if the same symmetric risk was added at more than one point in time
(given that the risky option yields at all these points the same expected payoff). Second,
it holds true if we add a little symmetric risk to the safe option in period τ¯ . In this case,
the risky option is riskier as the symmetric spread in period τ¯ is larger for the risky than
for the safe option. Then, our model meets predictions by rational choice as a risk averse
decision maker will opt for the safer and a risk-seeking decision maker will opt for the
riskier option. While the preceding analysis builds on risks that are exactly symmetric, it
is not the case that for any risk that is slightly asymmetric choiceswould be overoptimistic.
The more asymmetric, however, a mean preserving spread is, the more likely it is that
actions are overoptimistic (see Section 4.1).
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To sum up, we have shown that our model does not predict overoptimism in cases in
which symmetric risk was added to a safe option. Instead, an agent following our model
opts for the safe option if and only if it is preferred by a rational agent. This is one of the
most robust settings where expected utility theory is typically assumed to be valid and
decision makers typically behave risk-averse (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).21,22
So far, we have analyzed highly asymmetric risks where one attention-grabbing up- or
downside can be realized with a small probability and symmetric risks as represented by
mean-preserving symmetric spreads. We will briefly discuss the case of medium proba-
bilities where the up-/downside risk is asymmetric, but not highly asymmetric.
Suppose some asymmetric downside (upside) risk becomes more symmetric in the
sense that the downside (upside) probability is increased while the corresponding down-
side (upside) payoff is decreased in absolute value. Suppose further that the expected
value in each period stays constant (i.e., f in formula (HC) stays constant). Note first that
the option’s evaluation in frame (E) does not change (see Equation (1)). For downside
risks, salience of the downside induces the decision maker to adopt frame (E), indepen-
dent of whether the downside probability is low or medium. Thus, making a downside
riskmore symmetrical has no effect on the propensity to decide overoptimistically. In con-
trast, in the spirit of BGS, Proposition 1, making an upside risk more symmetric reduces
the distortion of the option’s valuation in frame (S) if the focusing bias is sufficiently strong
(see (TB)). As in equilibrium for upside risks frame (S) is adopted, making an upside risk
more symmetric makes overoptimistic actions that are risk-seeking less likely.
5 Related Literature on Self-Servingness, Overconfidence, and
Framing
Our model shares the predictions of other models, in which decision makers cannot only
choose an option, but in which they can also decide on their expectations, their beliefs
or their framing of a given decision problem. In this section, we will briefly point out
differences between our model and these related models.
Mayraz (2011)’s model of wishful thinking assumes that a decision maker’s beliefs
depend crucially on her interests and howher interests bias the processing of information.
A single parameter measures whether a decisionmaker is optimistic or pessimistic. In the
21Risk aversion can be one-to-one identified with preferences for second-order stochastic dominating op-
tions, see for example Hadar and Russell (1969). Therefore, in the simplest test for risk-aversion, subjects
choose between (1) a monetary lottery with symmetric risk and (2) its expected payoff. Here, (1) is the sim-
plest lottery which is second-order stochastic dominated by (2). For instance, Kahneman (2011) lists this
example in order to define risk aversion. Therefore, all studies which test for risk aversion insinuate that
the revealed preference approach is valid in such simple setups and that information about one’s true utility
function can be elicited through this procedure. Our model also predicts that decision makers reveal their
true preferences in such setups.
22Our results also apply if the agent’s attitude toward risk depends on whether the agent faces monetary
gains or losses. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have suggested that an agent is risk-averse in the domain of
positive payments and risk-seeking in the domain of negative payments. The preceding proposition gener-
alizes to this case.
22
case of optimism, the decision maker maximizes a distorted utility function, according
to which probability weights are upward distorted for those events which are favorable
for the decision maker, while they are downward distorted for unfavorable events. This,
however, predicts that overoptimism is, for optimistic individuals, universal. Therefore,
this model cannot account for rational, risk-averse behavior as predicted by our model
(see Section 4.2).
According to Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), decision makers experience anticipa-
tory utility, such that decision makers may benefit from overoptimistic beliefs as gains
in anticipatory utility may outweigh losses resulting from overoptimistic actions. Both
Brunnermeier and Parker and ourmodel predict rational decisionmaking only in settings
where decision makers choose between a safe option and a mean preserving symmetric
spread.
In general, Brunnermeier and Parker predict a preference for risky options with pos-
itively skewed distributions as these allow for overoptimistic beliefs concerning highly
positive, but unlikely events. Thereby, their model can account for gambling, lottery pur-
chases and related phenomena, which have also been rationalized by our mechanism. A
positive skew induces decision makers in our model to choose frame (S) and to thereby
overweight unlikely, salient outcomes as these are favorable if the distribution is positive.
In contrast to our model, however, a negative skew induces decision makers to be pes-
simistic in the model by Brunnermeier and Parker.23 Consequently, the model by Brun-
nermeier and Parker cannot account for overoptimism with respect to harmful consump-
tion. We predict that decision makers are induced to use frame (E) for decision situations
in which the risky option is negatively skewed unless psychological costs of using (E) are
particularly high, for instance if the downside state is particularly vivid as in the exam-
ples given in the previous section. In addition, empirical findings by Coutts (2015) and
Mayraz (2013) are inconsistent with the model by Brunnermeier and Parker as they do
find that raising the costs of mistaken beliefs reduces overoptimism.
Bracha and Brown (2012) consider a model where a decision maker’s choices are af-
fected by both rational and emotional processes. In their model, the emotional process
affects risk perception in an optimistic fashion. The emotional process chooses an optimal
risk perception that balances affective motivation—the desire to hold a favorable personal
risk perception—and a taste for accuracy, whereby distortions of objective risks result in
mental costs. The rational process then chooses an action given the risk perception. The
equilibrium notion is quite similar to our approach in that risk perception and decisions
are consistently chosen. As in our approach, their model predicts a tendency to act in an
overoptimistic fashion—via endogenous risk perception in their model and frame choice
in ours. Bracha and Brown’s model allows for a much more flexible distortion of risk per-
ceptions than our model. As the mental cost function is unobservable, a wide range of
23Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) discuss negative skews with the example of stocks: “[...] because the
payoff of the asset is negatively skewed, agents with optimal expectations would be pessimistic about the
payout of the asset and short the asset” (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005, p. 1103).
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overoptimistic risk perceptions can be supported by their model. In contrast, our model
bounds the decision maker to choose between two frames, so that it grants the decision
maker much less flexibility for distorting perceptions. This difference can best be seen
by looking at decision making when facing symmetric spreads. In contrast to our model,
their approach does not always predict rational, risk-averse behavior when facing sym-
metric spreads due to the tendency of the emotional process to perceive risk optimistically
(see the discussion in 4.2).24
Wu (1999) considers a model where decision makers may feel anxiety because of de-
layed resolution of uncertainty. If a decision maker dwells on better outcomes in future
periods, she has an optimistic attitude and hence overweights positive outcomes. This ap-
proach would also predict overoptimistic choices as in our framework, in particular, if the
time horizon is long.25 Unlike our approach, the anxiety model would then also predict
too optimistic decisions when a decision maker is facing lotteries with a mean-preserving
symmetric spread (see Section 4.2).
Finally, it should also be noted that risk-seeking behavior cannot produce our results
as it account for the plausible limitations of overoptimism (Section 4.2). Also the heuristic
that probabilities of positive events are over- and probabilities of negative events are un-
derweighted could account for overoptimistic actions, but not for the limitations of such
behavior.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper proposes an attention-based theory of framing of intertemporal decision situ-
ations. The theory is based on two psychological phenomena: When making decisions,
humans tend to overweight salient features. Furthermore, humans tend to interpret in-
formation in a self-serving manner leading to our notion of an endogenously determined
representation (frame) of a decision situation. By doing so we have combined alternative
approaches of existing attention-based theories of decision making (Bordalo et al., 2012;
Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013) into one coherent framework.
As a main prediction we provide a rationale for overoptimistic choices that can often
be observed in practice. The model gives an explanation as to how and why decision
makers underrate downside risks but overrate upside risk. In a single framework this can
explain not only excessive gambling, but also an excessively unhealthy diet. However, we
emphasize that our model does not always predict overoptimistic choices. For instance, a
risk-averse decision maker will not reveal overoptimistic choices when facing the choice
between a safe option and a mean-preserving symmetric spread. Furthermore, actions
24Note that in Bracha and Brown (2012) when facing the choice between a safe option and a symmetric
spread a decision maker will only chose the safe option when the utility function is sufficiently concave
and/or the mental cost function sufficiently steep. Otherwise the decision maker might choose the risky
option, and in this case the emotional process will overweight the probability of a positive outcome.
25Note that Wu (1999) also considers the case where a decision maker is anxious about negative outcomes
and as a result behaves pessimistically.
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induced by an adoption of frame (S) are less likely to be overoptimistic if upsides are
less salient, for instance if they are more likely to occur, but smaller in size. The more
asymmetric a decision situation is, the more likely actions tend to be overoptimistic.
While we have abstracted from the role discounting plays in our main analysis, in
general discounting could amplify or mitigate the effects, depending on whether costs or
benefits lie in the future. If future consequences are strongly discounted, the focus weight
attached to these consequences is also smaller. If an option’s attention-grabbing feature
lies in the future, discounting mitigates focus effects. Conversely, if the salient choice
features are in the present, while the non-attention grabbing features lie in the future,
focus effects are larger if discounting plays a role. In general, shifting decision situations
and all of their consequences to the future should make decision situations appear to be
more balanced so that focus effects should play less of a role and overoptimistic actions
should become less likely.
Similarly, we could extend our approach straightforwardly towardnon-stationary risk-
preferences by using instantaneous utility functions that differ over time. As we consider
only static decisions, our analysis holds true if changes in risk preferences are not antici-
pated. If differing risk preferences are anticipated, focus effects are amplified if the utility
function is rather flat in those periods where non-salient consequences occur, and miti-
gated if the utility function is flat in the periods with attention-grabbing consequences.
While the model’s predictions are in line with many observed phenomena, in future
work our predictions might be tested more directly. For instance, in a laboratory experi-
ment, a possible test design could be the following. Given a subject’s instantaneous utility
and discounting functions have been elicited, a subject makes a decision with intertem-
poral consequences that are spread over various periods. In another treatment, expected
utilities are replaced by distributions. If the distributions’ upsides are salient, subjects
should adopt frame (S) and decide accordingly. If, in contrast, the distributions have
salient downsides, frame (E) should be adopted and behavior should not be affected by
whether expected utilities or the respective distributions are provided.
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Appendix
A Interdependent States
We previously assumed that state realizations at all points in time are independent. This assump-
tion may be too strict for many practical problems. For instance, falling sick with diabetes because
of an unhealthy diet at a certain point in time is strongly correlated with suffering from diabetes
at a consecutive point in time. Therefore, we generalize our model in order to account for in-
tertemporal correlations. We take the time-horizon T , set I and the random variables ciτ with the
corresponding and the measurable spaces (Sτ ,F) as introduced in Section 2. Define S := ⊕
τ∈T
Sτ
with the canonical σ-algebraF := ⊗
τ∈T
Fτ . Consider the probability space (S,F , p) for a probability
measure p.
Then, we define
p(sτ ) := p({(s˜0, . . . , s˜T ) ∈ S|s˜τ = sτ}) =
∑
{(s˜0,...,s˜T )∈S|s˜τ=sτ}
p((s˜0, . . . , s˜T )).
While this gives the formal generalization of our model toward intertemporal interdepen-
dence, the examples which we will consider in the following require much less notation. As
analyzing general correlations is intractable, we consider a very strong form of correlation and
illustrate that our findings are robust with respect to such interdependent state realizations and
do not rely on our independence assumptions. Instead, overoptimistic actions are also prevalent
in settings where outcomes in different periods are interdependent.
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Harmful consumption and incurable diseases. Especially for severe diseases like lung can-
cer or diabetes, the chance to be cured may be tiny. Therefore, we extend our analysis on harmful
consumption (Section 3) by assuming that, given a disease (the downside outcome, denoted cτ,2)
has occurred in a previous period, then it will last for all future periods. Formally, we assume that
cuτ = cτ,2 induces cuτ+1 = cτ,2 with probability one for all τ ∈ T \{T}. If, however, the adverse state
has not been realized in the past, then there is a fixed probability p of becoming ill at each point in
time. Therefore, the probability of being ill in period τ ≥ 1, is
pτ :=
τ∑
i=1
p · (1− p)i−1.
In particular, pτ+1 > pτ for all τ ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. We define fτ = pτL and assume that pt+n is
relatively small for all n. Then, as before, we obtain U(cu|S) < U(cu) < U(cu|E), and a decision
maker yields higher focus-weighted utility by choosing frame (E). Hence, our main insight from
Section 3 does not change, and the decision maker will choose the risky option as long as
Fg(F ) >
T∑
τ=1
g(fτ )fτ .
This holds in particular if
g(F )
g(fT )
>
TfT
F
.
Therefore, excessive harmful consumption may arise due to focusing according to frame (E) and
does not rely on the state independence assumption which we imposed in the previous sections.
Persistent business success. Analogously we can show that overoptimistic actions are also
robust with interdependent states in the case of upside risk. For instance, if a newly founded
business becomes very successful, then it could be unlikely that it will go bankrupt within the next
periods, butwill rather go on to be successful. Consequently, similar to the previous paragraph, we
assume that if the favorable outcome (the business success) has occurred in a previous period, then
it will last for all future periods. Else, the upside outcome is realized with the fixed probability q.
Analogously to the previous paragraph, the probability with which the favorable outcome occurs
in period τ ≥ 1 is
qτ :=
τ∑
i=1
q · (1− q)i−1.
Using this definition, one can show, as in Section 3, that by focusing on (S) a decision maker yields
a higher focus-weighted utility. That is, U(cu|S) > U(cu) > U(cu|E). With focus type (S) the
decision maker then chooses to go for the risky option if
−H +G ·
T∑
τ=1
qτg(G)
qτg(G) + (1− qτ )g(0) > 0.
A sufficient condition for this to hold is Equation (TB). Consequently, according to our model,
entrepreneurial overoptimism may also occur if business success is persistent over time.
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B Proof of Proposition 3
i) To show: U(A2|S) − U(A1|S) > 0. We show that this holds for the case that upside risk A2 is
more asymmetric than A1 in a single period τ , that is, if |T1| = 1. For notational convenience, we
drop the subscript τ in the following proof. This case straighforwardly generalizes to |T1| > 1. We
have that U(A2|S)− U(A1|S) > 0 holds if and only if
p2g(G2)G2 − (1− p2)g(L)L
p2g(G2) + (1− p2)g(L) −
p1g(G1)G1 − (1− p1)g(L)L
p1g(G1) + (1− p1)g(L) > 0
Inserting pi = (L+ z)/(L+Gi) and rearranging gives the equivalent condition
g(L)(g(G2)(G2 + L)(G1 − z)− g(G1)(G1 + L)(G2 − z)) + (G2 −G1)(z + L)g(G1)g(G2) > 0. (4)
We distinguish two cases: (1) If g(G2)(G1 − z)(G2 + L) ≥ g(G1)g(G1)(G2 − z), then 4 holds as
G2 > G1. (2) If g(G2)(G1 − z)(G2 + L) < g(G1)g(G1)(G2 − z), then
g(L)(g(G2)(G2 + L)(G1 − z)− g(G1)(G1 + L)(G2 − z)) + (G2 −G1)(z + L)g(G1)g(G2)
> g(G1)g(G2) ((G2 + L)(G1 − z)− (G1 + L)(G2 − z) + (G2 −G1)(z + L))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0.
As evaluations in frames (E) and (N) are not affected by the mean-preserving spreads that we
consider—U(A1|E) = U(A2|E) = U(A2) = U(A2)—we have proven part i).
ii) We have to show that U(A′1|S) − U(A′2|S) > 0 holds. As the proof in analogous to i) the
details are omitted here.
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